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Suppose I fill a balloon with helium and release it. This helium balloon
has a diameter. Indeed, it has to have a diameter and would not be a helium
balloon without one.
But what is its diameter?
As the balloon ascends and the helium expands, the diameter continu-
ously changes. Yet while the balloon can thus have an infinite number of
diameters, it cannot have just any diameter. The diameter is limited at the
short end by the degree to which the helium can be compressed within the
balloon and at the long end by the elasticity of the balloon's surface. The
balloon rises; the diameter grows larger; but at some point the balloon will
burst.
Now here is a question that, unfortunately, will be recognized as
philosophical: Have I just described one helium balloon with a changing
diameter, or is the balloon a different balloon at every moment that its
diameter changes?
I say "unfortunately" because flus is the kind of question that gives
philosophy a bad name.
B.
The perennial debate over the significance of authorial intent in the
interpretation of legal texts has taken a new and interesting turn. A decade
ago, two English professors, Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels,
originated an account of textual meaning that holds, not that appeal to
authorial intent is the preferable way, among various ways, of interpreting
* Professor of Law, Temple Umversity. I wish to thank Jane Baron and David Skeel
for their invaluable comments on an earlier version of this Article. Temple University School
of Law provided financial support.
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texts, but that it is the only way of interpreting texts. I Indeed, interpretation
can be nothing more or less than the determination of authorial intent
because "the meaning of a text is simply identical to the author's intended
meaning. ,
2
This account has recently found its way into the legal literature, partly
through the efforts of Knapp and Michaels, themselves,3 and also through the
essays of Paul Campos.4 The implication of Knapp and Michaels's
arguments for legal interpretation can be simply stated: The meaning of an
appellate decision, a statute, or a constitutional provision is necessarily the
meaning intended by the authors - the judge, the legislators, or the framers,
respectively 5
1. See generally Steven Knapp & Walter B. Michaels, Against Theory, 8 CRITICAL
INQUIRY 723 (1982).
2. Id. at 724. Although the term "text", as used in this Article, will usually refer to
writing, occasional examples will be drawn from speech. In general, the considerations
discussed m tlus Article as applicable to the interpretation of written texts will apply equally
to interpretation of other linguistic forms, such as, speech or sign language.
3. E.g., Steven Knapp & Walter B. Michaels, Intention, Identity, and the Constitution:
A Response to David Hoy, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS 187 (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992)
[hereinafter Knapp & Michaels, Intention, Identity, and the Constitution]; Steven Knapp,
Practice, Purpose, and Interpretive Controversy, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY 323
(Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991); Walter B. Michaels, The Fate of the
Constitution, 61 TEX. L. REv 765 (1982) (reviewing PHLIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTrrUTION (1982)).
4. E.g., Paul Campos, Against Constitutional Theory, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 279
(1992); Paul Campos, That Obscure Object of Desire: Hermeneutics and the Autonomous
Legal Text, 77 MINN. L. REv 1065 (1993) [hereinafter Campos, That Obscure Object of
Desire]; Paul Campos, Three Mistakes About Interpretation, 92 MICH. L. REv 388 (1993).
5. There is, of course, an important question of just who is the true author of, say, a
statute: the legislators? the drafters? those who voted affirmatively 9 Because this issue is
tangential to the matter I wish to address in this Article, I will use the terms "judge,"
"legislators," and "framers" throughout the text to signify whoever are the true authors of the
legal texts being discussed.
I will also ignore two other related issues. The first is whether one can sensibly talk
about the authorial intention of a collective body (i.e., the Supreme Court, the legislators, the
framers). The second is whether the very notion of subjective intention is coherent.
Throughout this Article, I will assume that subjective intentions are real and that one can
therefore sensibly ask what they are in a given situation. Clearly, if subjective intentions do
not exist, then the Knapp-Michaels thesis collapses. For an enlightening discussion of this
question, see generally Jane B. Baron, Intention, Interpretation, and Stones, 42 DUKE L.J.
630 (1992).
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Now, intentionalism is nothing new in law There is a long history of
legal scholars from Joseph Story6 to Raoul Berger' who insist, for example,
that the meaning of a constitutional text is just the meaning intended by the
framers and that "[t]o 'interpret' [a particular provision] in diametrical
opposition to that intention is to rewrite the Constitution. "I Moreover, Hans
Baade has recently identified intentionalism as the dominant, albeit
controversial, judicial approach to statutory interpretation.9
The issues for debate within this tradition are conceptual (e.g., what it
means for a group of individuals - framers, for instance - to have authonal
intentions), empirical (e.g., whose intentions the text in question represents),
and methodological (e.g., how best to identify what the author's actual
intentions were). 10 But the tradition is unified by the basic intentionalist
principle: Textual meaning is identical to the author's intended meaning.I'
6. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
at vi (Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds., Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833).
7 See generally RAOULBERGER, GOVERNMENTBYJUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).
8. Id. at 407 Nicholas Zeppos has asserted that intentionalism "now has no serious
defenders in the academy." Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory
Interpretation: An Empincal Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV 1073, 1087 (1992). Some recent
writings suggest that this assertion might not be the case. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 7,
at 407; Lmo A. Graglia, "Interpreting" the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REv
1019, 1023-24 (1992); Edward J. Melvin, JudicialActivism - The Violation of an Oath, 27
CATH. LAw. 283, 284-85 (1982).
9. See Hans W Baade, "Original Intent" in Historical Perspective: Some Critical
Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REv 1001, 1087-1102 (1991). But see Zeppos, supra note 8,.at 1087-88
(stating that both liberals and conservatives are critical of intentionalism).
10. It can be difficult to determine whether the debate is over theories of meaning or
over methodological concerns within a particular theory of meaning. For example,
textualism - especially in its recent revival through the opinions and scholarly writings of
Justice Antomn Scalia - focuses interpretive activity on determining the "literal" or
"ordinary" meaning of the text. See Deborah A. Geier, Commentary: Textualism and Tax
Cases, 66 TEMP. L. REV 445, 447-48 (1993). But, on the one hand, textualism can be
presented as a theory of textual meaning that competes with intentionalism. See. LESLIE F
GOLDSTEIN, IN DEFENSE OF THE TExT 2-3 (1991). Or, on the other hand, textualism can be
presented as a theory within intentionalism about the best method for determining the author's
intent. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2633 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
11. On this point, Campos is incorrect in suggesting that the claims of Knapp and
Michaels's intentionalism are fundamentally different on a theoretical level from "the
arguments of traditional intentionalists." See Campos, That Obscure Object of Destre, supra
note 4, at 1082; see also Campos, Against Constitutional Theory, supra note 4, at 284 (stating
that "any reading of a text simply consists of a search for authorial intention"). What
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Knapp, Michaels, and Campos take pains to point out that this principle
does not resolve the conceptual, empirical, and methodological debates. To
say, for instance, that the meaning of a statute is the meaning intended by the
legislators does not tell us whether the best way of identifying that meaning
is to focus on the plain meaning of the text, to analyze carefully the official
legislative reports, or to read the personal diaries and letters of the
legislators.12 The basic point is that, if one is truly trying to interpret the
statute, then one is necessarily trying to determine the meaning intended by
the legislators, however one does that.
What makes the writings of Knapp and Michaels particularly important
is that they provide arguments from another discipline - literary theory -
to support a principle that has been heretofore largely dogmatically assumed
by some legal theorists. Ironically, these arguments do much to expose
precisely what is problematic about that assumption. Knapp and Michaels's
intentionalism is a terribly unsatisfactory account of the meaning of legal
texts; indeed, it is a terribly unsatisfactory account of the meaning of texts
generally
The problem with intentionalism is not that interpreting a text to
conform with the author's intent is necessarily inappropriate. Often this
interpretation will seem the most sensible interpretation. Rather, the
problem is the insistence that a text can have only one meaning and that that
meaning is the author's meaning. This insistence seems radically at odds
with our everyday experience with texts. Truly, intentionalism may be a
case of people forgetting as academics what they knew as ordinary readers
and users of texts: The variability of a text's meaning is a necessary feature
of texts, just as the variability of diameter is a necessary feature of helium
balloons.
Campos seems to identify as traditional intentionalism - a kind of normative theory that
regards reliance on authorial intent as one (the preferable one) among various competing
interpretive approaches - seems rather to have been the creation of intentionalism's
opponents. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A
Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation", 58 S. CAL. L. REy 551, 556 (1985); Larry Simon,
The Authority of the Constitution and Its Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv 603, 608, 622 (1985). Legal theorists who actually
espouse mtentionalism tend to agree with Knapp, Michaels, and Campos that the meaning of,
say, a constitutional text is "simply identical" to the meaning intended by its authors. See,
e.g., BERGER, supra note 7, at 407; Graglia, supra note 8, at 1023-24.
12. See Campos, That Obscure Object of Desire, supra note 4, at 1091-93; Steven
Knapp & Walter B. Michaels, A Reply to Our Critics, 9 CRITICAL INQUIRY 790, 795-99
(1983)
TEXTAS TOOL. WHY WE READ THE LAW
The purpose of this Article is to articulate tis ordinary knowledge m
theoretical form. In Part II, I summarize the Knapp-Michaels argument and
give examples that cast doubt on its attractiveness as an explanation of our
common experience with texts. In Part III, I offer a different account of
what determines the meaning of texts generally - an account in which the
author's intent appears as just one of the many meanings that a specific text
might have. In Part IV, I apply this account to the particular problem of
interpreting legal texts.
ff. The Knapp-Michaels Account of Intentionalism
Knapp and Michaels's argument for intentionalism rests on three
premises. The first premise is a denial that a text is distinct from its
meaning. "3 Tins proposition seems true. What could a text apart from its
meaning possibly be? The only obvious candidate is the mere marks on the
page. But surely, as Knapp and Michaels suggest, our recognition of a set
of marks as a text - our finding them comprehensible m any manner
whatsoever - presupposes that we have already "read" these marks as
having meaning.
1 4
Having thus argued that a text is inseparable from its meaning, Knapp
and Michaels next argue that meaning is intentional.' 5 We can assign any
meaning to marks on a page.'6 We can determine this meaning by drawing
on tradition, as in ordinary language, or by reference to specialized
conventions, as in legal terms-of-art, or by choosing purposely unfamiliar
meanings, as in a code. Thus, the following marks - "Give me liberty or
give me death!" - can as marks have an infinite number of meanings. They
could mean a rmgmg endorsement of freedom, or they could mean "Eat
tofu!" They could be a recipe for gefilte fish, or they could be a lyric poem
13. See Steven Knapp & Walter B. Michaels, A Reply to Richard Rorty: What Is
Pragmatism?, 11 CRITICAL INQUIRY 466, 468 (1985) [hereinafter Knapp & Michaels, A Reply
to Richard Rorty] (stating that text gets its identity from authorial intention).
14. See Knapp & Michaels, Against Theory, supra note 1, at 726 (discussing assignment
of particular intention to words in order to arrive at meaning).
15. See id. at 725-30 (discussing meaning and intention).
16. Children understand the assignability of meaning in, for example, their spontaneous
creation of nonsense words, the sense of which is understood through explicit or tacit
agreement. Along similar lines, my five-year-old daughter one day responded to a question
I asked, which called for a yes-or-no answer, with the following: "If I say 'yes,' it means
'no,' and if I say 'no,' it means 'yes"" My daughter fully understood that she could assign
arbitrary meanings to (in this case) sounds and that as long as she and I understood what those
meanings were, communication was possible.
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or a telephone number m some not yet invented language. The marks can
mean anything, and thus they mean nothing simply as marks. What makes
these marks a text - what makes them meaningful - is a decision that
assigns to them a particular meaning.
To these two premises - that a text is inseparable from its meaning and
that the meaning of a text is an intended meaning - Knapp and Michaels add
a third: Textual identity requires that the meaning of a given text be
unchanging.1 7  This proposition lies at the very heart of Knapp and
Michaels's argument. For when we add it to the first two premises, then the
intentionalist principle - that the meaning of a text is nothing other than the
meaning intended by the author - readily follows. The point is summarized
by Michaels:
[A]bsent the bare text, what principle of identity authorizes us to say that
a text that means one thing is the same text as a text that means something
else? If the meaning of the Constitution is no longer its original meaning,
then in what sense is the Constitution still the original text? One might
perhaps argue that the texts are the same in that they consist of the same
set of marks on paper. Indeed, in imagining what it would be like to
interpret a text while disregarding its original meaning, [Professor
Michael J.] Perry seems precisely to envision us attaching new meanings
to the same set of marks that the Framers attached the old meanings to.
Such a procedure is, of course, perfectly possible. Something like it
happens every time somebody uses a word differently from somebody
else - two different meanings get attached to the same sounds m the air
or the same marks on paper. But, of course, we don't call this "interpre-
tation"; we call it "speaking" or "writing."
In other words, the only relation between the Constitution that means
what its authors intended it to mean and the Constitution that means what
it means to us is that they look a lot alike. The "nonorigmalist" inter-
preter isn't interpreting an old text, but either writing a new one or
imagining that someone else has written it. To interpret a text is only
to give an account of what it means. If texts in themselves have no
meaning - if marks on paper are not intrinsically meaningful - then an
account of what a text means will be an account of the meaning attached
to those marks by some agent. And if we are trying to figure out the
meaning attached by someone else then what we are doing is reading,
whereas if we attach the meaning ourselves, then what we are doing is
17 Steven Knapp & Walter B. Michaels, Against Theory 2: Hermeneutics and
Deconstruction, 14 CRrTcAL INQUIRY 49, 68 (1987) [hereinafter Knapp & Michaels, Against
Theory 2].
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writing. Thus, to read the Constitution at all is to read it as the expres-
sion of the intentions of its authors.
18
Knapp and Michaels can surely invoke lots of examples that seem to
illustrate this account of textual meaning. Consider the following variation
on a scenario posed by Michaels.' 9 Suppose that a shopping list tells the
shopper, who is not the author of the list, to buy "fruit, but not vegetables."
Suppose that the author did not intend the term "fruit" to include tomatoes,
but the shopper, unaware of the author's intent, decides to buy tomatoes
because they are botanically classified as a fruit. My guess is that most
people would say that the shopper was incorrect in interpreting the shopping
list to include tomatoes. We are likely to say that the shopper made a
mistake (albeit, perhaps, an understandable one); although the term "fruit"
can have a meaning that includes tomatoes, that meaning is not the meaning
that it had in this context, on this list. In short, we would take the meaning
of "fruit" on this shopping list to be limited to an unchangeable meaning -
the particular meaning intended by the list's author.2"
Similarly, if I stay put at an mtersection after my driving instructor yells
"Go!" when the traffic'light turns green, 21 it will do me no good to argue that
"Go!" could mean "Stop!" That is, of course, true,' but in tis particular
context, "Stop!" actually meant "Stop!", and the unchangeable meaning of
that "text" seems to have been fixed by its author's intent.
In other situations, however, it is less clear that a text can have only one
meaning. Suppose that upon reading Michaels's response to Professor
Perry's essay on interpretation my friend comments, "I think he did a good
job parrying the thrust of that article." However, after I rant about what a
lame pun that is, my friend replies honestly that I am right but that the pun
was completely unintended. What should I make of tlus? A pun depends
upon a text having a double meaning, but my friend did not intend a double
18. Walter B. Michaels, Response to Perry and Simon, 58 S. CAL. L. REv 673, 677-78
(1985).
19. See id. at 678-79.
20. We might admonish the author to be clearer in the future, but that is a different
point.
21. For a discussion of this kind of example, see Knapp & Michaels, Against Theory 2,
supra note 17, 54-56, and Michaels, Response to Perry and Simon, supra note 18, at 674.
22. Suppose, for example, that my instructor, frustrated by my seeming inattentiveness
to past traffic signals, ironically says "Go!" the next time that an approaching light turns red.
23. See generally Michaels, Response to Perry and Simon, supra note 18; Perry, supra
note 11.
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meaning in his use of the term "parrying." Is an unintentional pun an
oxymoron? Presumably, Knapp and Michaels would say yes. If a text can
only have a particular meaning - the meaning intended by its author - then
an unintended pun is no pun at all. But I heard it as a pun. Knapp and
Michaels would say that I was mistaken. 4 The question I want to simply
raise at this point is: Would it be more enlightening to say that I was
rmstaken, that no pun was uttered, or to say that the sentence uttered by my
friend could be interpreted as a pun even though it was not so intended by,
and thus did not originally have that meaning for, him?z
Here is another example. Suppose that Congress enacted legislation
making the importation of foreign "fruit" a crimmal offense. In addition,
suppose that I have been indicted for importing foreign tomatoes and that my
defense - that it never occurred to me that tomatoes were fruit - gets a
sympathetic hearing m a federal district court, notwithstanding conclusive
evidence that Congress intended to include the importation of tomatoes in the
ban. How should we explain the judge's dismissal of the indictment? Knapp
and Michaels would say that the meaning of "fruit" in the statute includes
tomatoes, but that the separate question remains whether a judge should
enforce the statute when ordinary people would not likely recognize the
obscure usage of the term.26 Now, there is nothing especially offensive
about this description. But why is it preferable to the more traditional
account - namely, that the statute is ambiguous, that this text thus can be
interpreted in different ways, and that considerations of fairness (not the
mandate of textual identity) counsel choosing the text's "plain meaning" over
its intended meaning in the context of a criminal prosecution?
Similarly interesting problems of textual ambiguity abound in Knapp
and Michaels's own territory- literary criticism. Suppose that I read a poem
that quickly becomes one of my favorites both for its musicality and for what
seem to me its particularly haunting and complex metaphors. When I get the
chance to discuss all this with the poet, however, she seems puzzled and
explains her own understanding of her poem, which is much simpler and, m
my view, more pedestrian. Must I now give up what strikes me as a
24. See Knapp & Michaels, A Reply to Richard Rorty, supra note 13, at 470 (discussing
hearing noise as utterance "Fire!"); Knapp & Michaels, Against Theory, supra note 1, at 733-
35 (discussing hearing "random noise" as name "Marion").
25. Freudian analysis trades heavily on the phenomenon of unintended meaning by
attributing to utterances a meaning determined by the unconscious that may be at odds with
the conscious intention of the speaker. I thank David Skeel for this observation.
26. See Michaels, Response to Perry and Simon, supra note 18, at 680.
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substantially more appealing interpretation of the poem? Knapp and
Michaels would say that I can retain my interpretation, but that I should be
clear about what I am doing: An interpretation that is at odds with the poet's
intended meaning is not really an interpretation of her poem at all; rather,
I am creating a new poem (one that looks just like hers) with a different
meaning - my intended meaning.27 According to Michaels: "[1I]f we are
trying to figure out the meaning attached by someone else then what we are
doing is reading, whereas if we attach the meaning ourselves, then what we
are doing is writing."I
I recognize that the role of authorial intent in literary interpretation has
been at least as hotly debated over the years as the role of original intent in
constitutional interpretation. But the reason to be skeptical of Knapp and
Michaels's distinction between reading (interpreting) someone else's poem
and writing a new one becomes clear when we move to the example of
William Blake's reissue in 1794 of his 1789 poems, Songs of Innocence.2 9
What was remarkable about tlus reissue was that Blake took the occasion to
repudiate his original interpretation of the poems and offer a new, signifi-
cantly different understanding.3" But Knapp and Michaels describe tus event
differently 3' Because the meaning of the 1789 poems "is simply" the
meaning intended by the author at their creation, Blake's "new" interpreta-
tion is either a misreading of his poems or a creation of a set of new,
fundamentally different poems, which happen to look a lot like the earlier
ones. 32 Because there is no particular reason to think that Blake would have
misread his own poems, Knapp and Michaels emphasize the second
possibility - the 1794 text is different from the 1789 text; they are different
poems.33
With all due respect, this explanation is a rather goofy account of what
Blake did in 1794, and I find it hard to believe that Knapp and Michaels
themselves take it seriously I' can scarcely imagme either of them criticizing
a student who has presented the 1789 interpretation while reading from the
27 See Knapp & Michaels, A Reply to Our Critics, supra note 12, at 797-98 (stating
that "we can['t] interpret a text without interpreting it as what we believe its author
meant. [We can misinterpret what the author meant.").
28. Michaels, Response to Perry and Simon, supra note 18, at 678.
29. See generally WILLIAM BLAKE, SONGS OF INNOCENCE AND OF EXPERIENCE (1967).
30. See E.D. Hirsch, Jr., Against Theory?, 9 CRrTICAL INQUIRY 743, 746 (1983).
31. See Knapp & Michaels, A Reply to Our Critics, supra note 12, at 797-98.
32. See id. at 797
33. See id.
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1794 text. Nor can I imagme either of them making the point more
pedantically - perhaps telling the student that for the sake of efficiency she
may continue to read the 1794 text, but that she should keep in mind that she
is actually interpreting the 1789 poems, which just happen to look like the
ones that she is holding m her hand.
Of course, these examples do not constitute arguments to refute the
notion that the meaning of a text is fixed from the moment of its creation.
Rather, I have employed them to try to raise the question of why we should
believe that this is the case when in our ordinary experience it seems more
useful to describe at least some texts as having multiple, inconsistent
meanings (e.g., the pun and the "fruit" statute) or a meaning that changes
over time (e.g., Blake's poems).
Knapp and Michaels present us with an exceedingly unattractive choice:
Either we must believe that text and meaning are inseparable, m which case
we must believe that "textual identity"34 requires a fixed, unchanging
meaning, or we must believe that a text is simply the marks on the page, in
which case the text can be assigned any meaning at all. But to think that this
is the choice is like thinking that either we must believe that a helium balloon
and its diameter are inseparable and that "balloon identity" therefore requires
a fixed, unchanging diameter or we must believe that balloon and diameter
are distinct, in which case a balloon can have any diameter at all.
Experience, of course, suggests an alternative possibility- The diameter
is an inseparable feature of a balloon, and the diameter can constantly
change, and the diameter can only change within certain limits. If a balloon
can have a limited but variable diameter without impairing the integrity or
identity of the balloon, why should we not also believe that a text can have
a limited but variable identity without its impairing the integrity or identity
of the text?
In the next Part, I offer an account of just why we should think that
variable meaning is a feature of texts. I draw not on the helium balloon for
my analogy, but on the screwdriver - more generally, on tools. Actually,
my argument, strictly speaking, is not based on an analogy I argue that the
proposition that a single text can have different meanings is a corollary of the
proposition that a single tool can have different uses. This is true because
texts are tools.
34. E.g., Knapp & Michaels, Against Theory 2, supra note 17, at 58.
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III. Text as Tool
A.
Consider the screwdriver. I suppose that some person or group of
people invented the screwdriver. And I suppose that it was invented with
some particular purpose in mind. For tis discussion, let us assume that the
screwdriver was invented for the sole purpose of inserting and removing
slotted screws.
I have spent tlus day inserting and removing slotted screws with my
screwdriver, and now I am ready to apply a coat of polyurethane to the table
that I am building. But wait! How do I remove the lid from the poly-
urethane can? I know- I will pry the lid off with my screwdriver. But wait!
Am I really using the screwdriver? After all, prying off lids was not the
inventor's intended use in creating that tool. Perhaps I am using a tool that
just looks a lot like a screwdriver, but really is a different tool - one with
the intended purpose (my intended purpose) of prying off lids.
Let me make this point differently I will say, instead, that when I use
the tool to pry off the lid, I am not using it as a screwdriver, but as some
other kind of tool. It is important, however, to be clear about just what is
being said now I am distinguishing between normal and abnormal uses of
the tool; I am noting my use of a screwdriver for a purpose for which
screwdrivers are not ordinarily used. We might all agree that I am not using
the tool as a screwdriver, but we might make virtually the same point by
saying, "It is really convenient that you can use a screwdriver for things
beside inserting and removing slotted screws."
Of course, a screwdriver can be used for things other than inserting and
removing slotted screws. I can use a screwdriver as an attention-getter by
pounding on the wall with it if I find myself locked in the bathroom. Or I
can use a screwdriver as a weapon if I am attacked while walking through
a park. Or I can use a screwdriver as an aesthetic object by incorporating
it in my sculpture, "Still Life with Screwdriver."
Thinking of a screwdriver as having uses other than that use intended
by its inventor does not require us to magme that the screwdriver is distinct
from its uses. On the contrary, the screwdriver is in some crucial way
defined by its uses. We might, as noted above, want to distinguish between
normal and abnormal uses of a screwdriver. But this distinction is clearly
a matter of convention, not of original intent. If enough people regularly use
a screwdriver to pry off lids, in time this use will come to be seen as one of
the things for which a screwdriver is employed.
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That the set of uses of a screwdriver is a feature of the tool, rather than
something distinct from the tool, can be seen in the fact that we cannot use
the screwdriver for just any purpose. Characteristics of the tool will limit
its use. If I wish to use my screwdriver to get a closer look at the moons of
Jupiter, I am in for serious disappointment. In a very real sense, this latter
kind of limitation on use is a function of the inventor's intent. The use that
the inventor had in mind determined the design of the tool, and this design,
in turn, limits the potential uses of the tool. Yet, within the range permitted
by the inventor's intended design, all sorts of unintended uses might be
discovered. 5
Moreover, context will limit use. If I am pleasantly working on
building a table in my basement, I will not at that time be able to use the
screwdriver to fend off a mugger in the park. And while I could use the
screwdriver to bang violently on the table that I am building in order to
attract attention to myself, such a use in that context might seem quite
irrational.
The notion that the integrity of a tool is not impaired by putting it to
uses not intended by the inventor is clearly seen in the case of a therapeutic
drug. For instance, the synthetic drug mmoxidil was created to control high
blood pressure.36 Taken orally for this purpose, mmoxldil has had from the
outset for some users the disagreeable side effect of causing fine body hair
to grow, thicken, and darken. At a point subsequent to its invention,
someone realized that mmoxidil might be applied topically to stimulate the
regrowth of hair on bald individuals and to slow the balding process. This
new use is now seen as a normal use of mmoxidil.37
We do not choose to say that the drug mmoxidil that is used to control
blood pressure is different from the drug mmoxidil that is used to promote
hair growth. Instead, in both instances we use the same generic name -
mmoxidil - to denote the same drug with different uses.38 In other words,
35. Moreover, the dialectical relationship between design and use is such that as uses
change, what we recognize as essential elements of the design of the tool might change. Thus,
if prying open lids comes to be seen as a normal use for screwdrivers, the design of the tool
might change subtly to facilitate that use - without destroying our perception of the tool as
a screwdriver.
36. I thank Dr. Richard Baron for this example.
37 In fact, because of the undesirable side effects of minoxidil tablets, the use of
mmoxidil as a topical cream to promote hair growth has become the more popular use of the
drug.
38. For marketing purposes, however, the generic drug mmoxidil is given different trade
names corresponding to its different uses: Loniten (to treat hypertension) and Rogaine (to
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the identity and integrity of the drug are not impaired by the fact that the
drug has multiple uses or by the fact that the drug has been put to a new use
since its creation. Nor do we infer that mnoxidil can be put to just any use
we want simply because it has different uses. The idea that a single drug can
have limited but variable uses seems as plausible as the idea that a screw-
driver, or any tool, can have limited but variable uses.
B.
We use texts. We read texts for many reasons, such as entertainment,
information, or aesthetic experience. The way that we use texts to achieve
a particular purpose is to interpret the text - that is, to determine the text's
meaning. Just as any tool must be manipulated to be used, a text must be
interpreted to be used. A screwdriver will not jump up and do things for its
user; so it is that "no text reads itself."3 9 This idea suggests an alternative to
Knapp and Michaels's notion that the meaning of a text is determined by the
author's retentions: ° namely, that the meaning of the text - the correct
interpretation of the text4 - is determined by the use to which the text is
put. Consequently, if a particular text can be employed for various uses,
then the text may be susceptible to various "correct" interpretations.
If a text is a kind of tool, then the question of how to interpret a text is
a particular version of the general question of how to handle a tool.
Accordingly, the answer to the question of interpretive method is determined
by the use to which the text is put. The proper technique for handling a
screwdriver will vary depending on whether I wish to insert a slotted screw
or pry open a lid. Similarly, the proper method for interpreting a poem will
depend on whether I am reading the poem to gain insight into the biography
promote hair growth).
39. Stanley Fish, Consequences, 11 CRTCAL INQUIRY 433, 446 (1985).
40. See supra text accompanying note 1.
41. The account of a text's meaning that I am presenting in this Article has its roots in
classic pragmatism. While the early pragmatists were not especially concerned with texts,
they did develop rich theories of signs that connected meaning to purpose. In his 1905 paper,
What Pragmatism Is, Charles Sanders Peirce described how as a young man
he framed the theory that a conception, that is, the rational purport of a word or
other expression, lies exclusively in its conceivable bearing upon the conduct of
life Now quite the most striking feature of the new theory was its
recognition of an inseparable connection between rational cognition and rational
purpose
JOHN P MURPHY, PRAGMATSM: FROM PEIRCE TO DAVIDSON 40 (1990) (quoting Charles
Sanders Peirce).
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of its author - in which case I might want to use techniques that would
uncover the author's specific intent - or reading the poem to have an
aesthetic experience - in which case I might read the language for its
maximum subtlety and richness of allusion.
The idea of text as a tool allows us to see why the examples invoked by
Knapp and Michaels appear to tie textual meaning to authonal intent. When
I go shopping with a list prepared by someone else,42 it seems obvious that
the correct interpretation of the list is the meaning intended by its author
because the only apparent purpose for my using the list is to obtain the
groceries that the list's author wants. In light of what we assume to be my
purpose for using the list, the meaning of the text is, of course, the author's
meaning.
Similarly, if my driving instructor yells "Stop!"43 it seems obvious that
the correct interpretation of that utterance is the meaning intended by the
speaker because the only apparent purpose for my interpreting the utterance
in that context is to identify what my instructor wants me to do. In light of
what we assume to be my purpose, the meaning of the word is, again, the
speaker's meaning.
What consideration of these examples suggests is that it is, in fact, the
interpreter's purpose for interpreting the text, not the author's purpose for
creating the text, that determines the text's meaning. 44 If the interpreter's
purpose requires identification of the author's intention, then that intention
may well be the text's meaning. If the interpreter's purpose is indifferent to
the author's intention, however - for example, when interpreting a poem
for aesthetic purposes - then the author's intention will be, at most,
suggestive, but not determinative.
As in the case of tools generally, the fact that the interpreter - the
user - of the text determines the purpose to which the text is put, and thus
the text's meaning, does not mean that the interpreter can as a practical
matter put the text to just any use and, correspondingly, give the text just any
meaning. Some uses are impossible. Thus, the text I was given as a
shopping list cannot be used as a city telephone directory 45 Some uses are
42. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (discussing shopping list example).
43. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (discussing driving instructor
example).
44. Of course, the first reader of any text is its author. Thus, at the time of the text's
creation, the author's purpose and the reader's purpose are the same.
45. For a discussion of the limitations on textual interpretation, see infra notes 69-73 and
accompanying text.
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possible, but are excluded as a practical matter by the context. Hence, while
standing in the supermarket and trying to choose groceries, I could read the
shopping list as a poem, but it would seem inappropriate to do so. 
4
C.
The foregoing discussion requires some clarification of the relationshup
between interpretive approaches and interpretive purposes - means and
ends, if you will. When I said above that the reader's purpose "determines
the text's meaning, ' I did not intend to suggest that a given purpose
generates a uniquely appropriate interpretive approach and a uniquely
appropriate meaning or that a purpose somehow logically contains the
approach appropriate to achieving it.
An interpretive approach and the meaning that flows from the approach
are the means by which the purpose for interpreting the text is served. As
with any tool, the "appropriate" technique for handling it is a matter of
experimentation, of trial and error.' To label a particular way of mampulat-
Ing a tool "appropriate" is to judge that the particular technique is suitable
to the purpose for which the tool is being used.
This judgment takes place continuously, and our conclusions are hence
subject to ongoing revision. Before I use a screwdriver to remove a slotted
screw, I judge - based on experience or instruction - how I should
manipulate the screwdriver to achieve that end. As I proceed, I monitor how
things are going. If my technique is working well - if it is effectively
serving my end - then I am using the tool appropriately; if the results leave
something to be desired, I will experiment with other techniques until I find
46. Sometimes, the context does not so clearly dictate choice. Consider Jane Baron's




Baron, supra note 5, at 657 We could read this text as a will, a whimsical recording of a
plan for a will provision, a "poem, a meaningless scribble, [or] a notation of graffiti seen in
a public restroom." Id. The less information we have about this text, the less reason we
might have for preferring one interpretation over another.
47 See supra text accompanying note 44.
48. The relationship between experience and experimentation, on the one hand, and
belief, knowledge, truth, and meaning, on the other, was a focal concern of classic
pragmatism. Particularly relevant to the discussion in the text is the work of John Dewey
See generally JOHN DEWEY, LOGIC: THE THEORY OF INQUIRY (1938).
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV 105 (1995)
the best approach (or settle for what seems best under the circumstances,
which include my own abilities).4 9
Similarly, a particular interpretation of a text is "appropriate" if it seems
adequate to serve the purposes for which the text is being read. As noted
above, if I am given a text and told to go buy groceries, the appropriate way
to read the text is as a shopping list, not as a lyric poem. But I.am simply
stating a judgment that reading it as a shopping list is the approach that is
most likely to get the job done.
My initial judgment could be wrong. Because interpretive judgments -
like all judgments about the handling of tools - are judgments about the
means appropriate to some end, these judgments are subject to correction
based on experience. The day that I begin to suspect that I can shop more
effectively by reading the paper in my hand as blank verse is the day that I
will start reading it as such. Right now I suspect, based on my experience,
that that day will never come. That hypothesis is provisional, however -
it will ultimately be tested against my future shopping experiences.
So far, this discussion assumes a fairly rigid distinction between inter-
pretive purposes, ends, and interpretive approaches, means. A moment's
reflection, however, reveals something quite different.
My screwdriver technique can be understood as a means to the end of
inserting slotted screws. But my purpose here - inserting slotted screws -
was not chosen randomly This purpose serves a further end: building a
table. That purpose serves an even further end: supplying an attractive
platform for a lamp next to my living room sofa. And so forth.
Each of our ends can be seen from a different angle to be a means to
other ends. A human life comprises a complex web of interrelated ends.'
One's actions at every moment can be understood to reflect explicit or
implicit judgments about what means will best serve that complex of short-
and long-term goals. I constantly revise and correct my conduct as I revise
and correct my judgments about what will best serve my ends. But I also
revise and correct my choice of ends themselves as I revise and correct my
49. The idea that the "correct" or "appropriate" use of a tool is subject to ongoing
testing and correction in light of experience is related to the Jamesean notion of the
corrigibility of truth in light of ongoing experience. See WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM 31
(1981).
50. Underlying this point - and, indeed, the whole line of argument developed in this
section - is the pragmatist doctrine that "distinctively human conduct can be interpreted and
understood only in terms of purpose." JOHN DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY 246
(Capricorn Books 1960) (1929); cf. Lon L. Fuller, Human Purpose and Natural Lav, 3 NAT.
L.F 68 (1958) (making similar point from natural law perspective).
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judgments about what ends will best fit with all of my other ends, or as I
decide to change the overall direction of my life in which the current
complex of goals points me.
Thus, we choose our ends as we choose our means - based on our
ongoing experiences - because a choice of ends is a choice of means. I
choose to read the text in my hand as a shopping list because I believe that
such a reading will best serve my purpose of buying groceries. This purpose
itself reflects a choice, one that serves as a means to further ends - giving
a party later in the day, or pleasing the person who gave me the text and sent
me to the store. I could make a different choice. I could decide that what
makes the most sense in my life then and there is to contemplate poetry The
text m my hand might then take on new meaning for me.
IV Why We Read the Law
A.
The text of the statute prohibiting the importation of foreign fruit"l is a
tool. But a tool for what? Why do we read a statute? Several answers are
possible.
We might believe that the wishes of democratically elected officials
should be carried out and that statutory texts express these wishes. In that
case, we read the "fruit" statute to identify the wishes, and the meaning of
the text is the legislators' intention.Y Let us suppose that the best mterpreta-
tion that would achieve this purpose determines that the statutory text bans
tomatoes.
Alternatively, we might believe that law imposes order on society by
communicating rules and the sanctions that will be umposed on violators. In
that case, we read the "fruit" statute m order to know what the rules are, and
the meaning of the text is the meaning that would ordinarily be commum-
cated to members of the public by the language employed.53 Let us suppose
51. See supra text accompanying note 26.
52. It should be noted here that the meaning of the text from this perspective is not
necessarily the meaning intended by the authors. The authors may well be legislative aides,
but their views would not be determinative because the aides are not the democratically elected
officials whose intentions count. Instead, our interpretive task in reading the statute is to
determine what the legislators meant when they transformed the authors' work into a law -
in Campos's terms, when they "reauthored" the law. Campos, Against Constitutional Theory,
supra note 4, at 284; see also infra note 63 and accompanying text.
53. This concept is the real significance of the "plain meaning rule." The idea that a
statute has a plain meaning is not, properly speaking, a belief that the meaning of a text can
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that the best interpretation that would achieve this purpose determines that
the statutory text does not ban tomatoes.
The debate over whether a statute should be interpreted in accordance
with the intent of the legislators or in accordance with its plain meaning is,
at its core, a debate over how a statutory text should be used. Asking
whether a statute is for commiumcating the intentions of democratically
elected officials or for announcing rules with clarity is like asking whether
a screwdriver is for inserting slotted screws or for prying open lids. The
answer in both cases is that either purpose is open to the user, who must,
therefore, choose.
An individual judge will choose her purpose the way that we all choose
our ends. Within a richly textured context that includes the current complex
of her short- and long-term goals, her experiences and the beliefs generated
by these experiences, and the present situation in which she finds herself
confronting the text, the judge will choose that interpretive goal that seems
to offer the best fit.
In the case of the screwdriver, the choice might be relatively straightfor-
ward: I need to use the screwdriver to build a table for my living room lamp.
The context that guides the interpretation of statutes is, however, likely to be
rich and nuanced. It will include the immediate situation - here, the
prosecution of a tomato importer. This dimension of context might press for
the second of the two uses identified above.
The context will also include the political beliefs of the judge. One who
believes that legislation reflects the will of the elected representatives of the
people will be inclined to place interpretive emphasis on the intent of those
representatives. In addition, the context might include a history of
interpretation of the statute. Accordingly, a third purpose that the interpreter
might wish to achieve is the kind of justice that comes from the consistent
use of coercive power. This purpose would press in favor of interpreting the
statute as it had been interpreted in the past. 4
Thus, one result of the richness of context is that the interpreter might
want to achieve multiple purposes. A judge nght want to interpret a statute
emerge from the marks on the page without resort to interpretive judgment. All texts must
be interpreted. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (providing Fish's statement that "no
text reads itself"). Rather, the "plain meaning rule" seeks a particular kind of interpretive
judgment - a judgment about whether there would be widespread agreement among "ordinary
people" (or perhaps those to whom the statute is understood to be addressed) about the
meaning of the statutory text.
54. This concept is the practical significance of stare decisis.
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m order to effectuate the intent of the legislators, to enforce clearly
commuicated rules, and to bring about justice. Sometimes all these
purposes can be fulfilled, just as it might be possible to use a screwdriver to
achieve the immediate goals of both inserting slotted screws and prying open
the lid of a can. It ught be the case, however, that m order to pry open the
lid, I will deform the screwdriver so that I will not be able to use the tool
subsequently to insert screws. Then I must choose among competing,
desired purposes. Or to achieve both purposes, I may have to obtain a new
screwdriver.
Similarly, it might not be possible to interpret a statute in a way that will
achieve multiple purposes. The fruit statute may present such a problem.
In this case, the interpreter (say, the trial judge) will have to decide among
competing, desired purposes. Thus, interpretation requires not only an
identification of purpose, but also a ranking of purposes. In the end, if the
sumultaneous attainment of various purposes is desired, it may be necessary
to amend the statute or to enact new legislation.55
B.
These considerations, winch I have been discussing in the context of a
statute, apply equally to the interpretation of other legal texts - e.g., judicial
opinions, administrative regulations, and constitutional provisions. In all of
these instances, the interpretation - and thus the meaning - of the text in
question will depend on the interpreter's purpose in reading the text. 6
A particular trial judge mght read an appellate court opinion m order
to conform Is ruling to the desires of judges superior to him in the judicial
55. The potential difficulty of using a statute to achieve multiple objectives illustrates
that, while the interpreter determines the purpose for reading the statute, the interpreter cannot
choose just any purpose or combination of purposes. See uyra notes 69-73 and accompanying
text (discussing limitations on textual interpretation).
56. Every interpretation of a text implies one or more purposes. It should be observed,
however, that the interpreter may not have consciously identified a purpose for reading the
particular text. When I read a letter from my friend, I will interpret it to determine her intent
because my purpose in reading a letter from her is to share her thoughts. Even if I do not
consciously tunk about that purpose, it will guide my interpretation. I will thus read the letter
differently than I would if I were using it as the source of a new espionage code.
On the other hand, the more clearly one understands one's purpose in reading a text, the
more effectively one can choose and employ the appropriate interpretive techniques. Some
of the muddled discussions in judicial opinions of the meaning of a precedent or a statute or
a particular constitutional provision may result from the judge not being especially clear about
his purposes for reading the legal text in question.
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hierarchy For this judge, the meaning of the opinion as precedent will be
the meaning intended by its authors. A different trial judge might read the
same opinion in order to determine what meaning will best fit with other
cases to form an organic unity For this judge, the intended meaning of the
precedent's authors might be.largely a matter of indifference. For other
judges, the purpose of precedent might be different; indeed, for many, the
purpose might be manifold.
It is in the realm of constitutional exegesis that the interpretive debates
have tended to attract particular attention from lawyers, judges, legal
scholars, and ordinary citizens - no doubt because something of enormous
importance always seems to hang in the balance. The hearings concerning
the nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the United States Supreme Court
were remarkable not least of all because a large national audience seemed
fascinated with often arcane discussions about constitutional interpretation.
These debates 7 take as the central question: How should we interpret
the Constitution? In the terms that I have been discussing, this question
translates into: Why does one read the Constitution? What is the purpose m
doing so? Any plausible answer that can be given to that question will
generate a corresponding interpretive approach.
Campos, however, following Knapp and Michaels, has argued that the
dominant approaches to constitutional interpretation do not yield interpreta-
tion at all. Campos characterizes a text as a "speech act," whose meaning
is, by definition, that of the speaker.5" Hence, interpretation of a constitu-
tional text is the identification of the author's - the framers' - intended
meaning. What has generally passed in our history for constitutional
interpretation, however, involves either ignoring or misrepresenting the
framers' intent or forthrightly substituting the reader's intent in its place in
order to achieve results inconsistent with what Campos holds to be the actual
meaning of the constitutional text. 9
In Campos's view, we have come to treat the Constitution not as a text,
but as a "sacred, or canonical, writing. "I Such a writing
no longer functions primarily as a speech act, but as a cultural artifact
which mimics a text and provides occasions for misreading and reauth-
57 See, e.g., Interpretation Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REV 1, 551-725 (1985) (articles
on constitutional interpretation). For a useful, partial typology of interpretive approaches to
the Constitution, see Campos, Against Constitutional Theory, supra note 4, at 289-98.
58. See Campos, Against Constitutional Theory, supra note 4, at 283-84, 303.
59. See id. at 289-98.
60. Id. at 303.
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ong. Sacred and canomcal writings are, by their nature, required to
perform work within a culture that is beyond the capacities of a mere text,
and although they begin their lives as texts - as speech acts - they
inevitably become detextualized as they gain sacred or canoical status.61
Unlike texts, argues Campos, "writing" - i.e., the marks on the
page - has no inherent meaningA2 Thus, when we choose to treat a text as
a writing, we can attribute to it whatever meaning we want. In giving the
writing the reader's meaning, a reader either misreads the text - if the
reader takes this meaning to be the actual meaning of the text - or "reauth-
ors"63 the text - if the reader is indifferent or opposed to the author's
meaning.
Campos understands sacred and canonical writings to serve a special
function for a culture. The reading of these writings is undertaken not in
order to determine their meaning - hence, they are not treated as texts -
but as an occasion for articulating or revisiting what the members of the
culture take to be essential truths, fundamental beliefs, and deepest values.64
Thus, as a sacred or canonical writing, the Constitution has been read not as
a text, says Campos, but - particularly with respect to its more general
clauses - as an expression of whatever we take at the present to be our most
basic political principles.'
What Campos fails to see is that the particular treatment accorded the
Constitution turns not on treating it as a writing instead of a text, but on
treating it as a particular kind of text. It is, after all, "a constitution we are
expounding."'
For some (perhaps many) readers, the Constitution is a sacred or
canonical text. For these readers, the point of reading the Constitution is,
indeed, to articulate the nation's most basic political principles. But
identifying ths point as a popular use of the Constitution does not mean, as
61. Id.
62. See d. at 284 (noting that critical distinction exists between "writing" and
"reauthoring").
63. In this view, examples of "reauthoring" a text include the critic who preferred his
own reading of a poem to the poet's, see supra text accompanying note 27, Blake's
reinterpretation of his earlier poems, see supra text accompanying note 30, and the reauthoring
of the exact text of Cervantes's Don Quixote by the title character in Jorge Luis Borges's story
Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote, see Campos, Against Constitutional Theory, supra note
4, at 280-82 (discussing Borges's story).
64. See Campos, Against Constitutional Theory, supra note 4, at 306.
65. See td. at 307-08.
66. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 407 (1819).
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Campos seems to believe, 67 that the Constitution is vulnerable to whatever
meaning the reader chooses to inpose on it. That would be the case if the
Constitution were treated merely as a writing - as marks on the page that
can be given any meaning. But we cannot give the Constitution just any
meaning. Reading it as a constitutional text is different from reading it as a
lyric poem or as an encoded recipe for gefilte fish. As a sacred or canonical
text, the Constitution will not express just any political principle, no matter
how fundamental we take it to be.6"
What accounts for these limitations on the interpretation of the
Constitution? I have suggested at various points m the discussion some of
the different limits on the use of tools, generally, and texts, including legal
texts, specifically 69 A more systematic account might be m order here.
The practical constraints on how a tool can be used can be typed
(somewhat artificially, but, I think, usefully) as material, contextual,
conventional, and normative. The uses of a screwdriver are materially
constrained; no matter how much I want to get a clearer look at Jupiter's
moons, the screwdriver will not help me because of its design and construc-
tion. Contextual constraints have to do with the situation in which the user
finds herself. If I am at my workbench building a table, the opportunity to
use the screwdriver as a weapon will not likely present itself. Conventions
for using the screwdriver act as limits on the user's imagination; the tool
might have myriad potential uses that will not be apparent to us because of
how we have been taught to use it and how we have observed others using
it. Finally, there are normative constraints. Among the different uses of the
screwdriver that are apparent to the user, some may seem undesirable or
even altogether inappropriate for instrumental and even ethical reasons. For
example, I might decide not to use the screwdriver to pry open a can because
of the potential for damaging the tool, or I might decide not to use it as a
weapon because I think that it is wrong to use physical aggression against
others.
As a tool, the interpretation of the constitutional text is subject to
analogous types of limitations. As the screwdriver will not serve the purpose
of astronomical observation, so the constitutional text will not serve as a city
67 See Campos, Against Constitutional Theory, supra note 4, at 307-08.
68. Suppose that many people believe that among our highest priorities as a nation is
providing every citizen with a guaranteed annual income. It does not follow that we would
be able to read the Incompatibility Clause or the Copyright Clause or the Due Process Clause
to mandate a guaranteed annual income.
69. See, e.g., supra notes 35, 46, 55.
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telephone directory In each case, the tool lacks features needed to serve the
proposed use. With respect to the text, the problem is not that it is
impossible to read it as an encoded telephone directory Rather, the problem
is that the interpretive conventions needed to do so do not currently exist,
and the excruciating effort needed to make the text, as written, communicate
the relevant information would almost certainly undermine the utility of the
project.
There are also contextual constraints on the interpretation of the
constitutional text.70 If a high school civics class is studying the First
Amendment, for example, the pressure might be strong to use the text as a
statement of fundamental political values, as currently conceived. That is,
a discussion of the Amendment nught well focus on the role of "free speech"
in contemporary society, rather than on its meaning to citizens in late
eighteenth century America. If, on the other hand, the Amendment is being
applied by a federal district judge m a particular case, the pressure might be
strong to use the text as an expression of the wishes of superior judges in the
judicial luerarchy In each case, different ways of interpreting the text
might seem more or less appropriate.7'
The conventional constraints follow from two hundred years of
interpretive practice. This practice of constitutional interpretation has shaped
our understanding of what a constitutional text can be - that is, what pur-
poses a constitutional text can serve. There are undoubtedly many potential
70. The emphasis on the function of context m interpretation is a central feature of
contemporary hermeneutics. Indeed, the pragmatist argument presented in this Article, with
its focus on use, shares characteristics with hermeneutics and its focus on application. See
generally HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Wemsheimer & Donald G.
Marshall trans., 2d ed. 1989) (5th ed. 1986). For a collection of essays specifically relating
hermeneutics to the interpretation of legal texts, see generally LEGAL HERMENEUTICS, supra
note 3. Not surprisingly, Knapp, Michaels, and Campos have written significant critiques of
contemporary hermeneutics from an intentionalist point of view. See generally Campos, That
Obscure Object of Desire, supra note 4; Knapp & Michaels, Against Theory 2, supra note 17
71. Compare the example of the shopping list/poem, supra text accompanying note 46.
It should be noted that many different contexts will require seeing the Constitution as
a public document, and this requirement, in turn, would subject this text to different
limitations from a document serving an essentially private function, for example, a letter from
a friend. First of all, we would treat the Constitution as a text written in English, rather than
in an unknown language with an exact physical, but not semantic, resemblance to English.
The Constitution would serve its function as a public document poorly if it were treated
otherwise. Similarly, a public function would limit the meaning of the text to meanings that
conform to the general conventions of English usage. That is, we would strive for meanings
that would seem plausible to ordinary speakers and readers of the language.
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uses of the Constitution that are not apparent to us because of the conven-
tions that have grown up around that practice. Of course, this situation
does not mean that new purposes cannot be thought of by inaginative users
of the Constitution, but only that their discovery is more or less difficult.
To say that practice has identified certain purposes through convention
is not to say that tradition has forged a consensus on the interpretation of
the Constitution. Debate occurs on at least two levels. On one level is the
debate over how the Constitution should be read to best address a particular
task at hand. On another level is the debate over what the task at hand
should be. For example, is our first priority maximizing autonomy,
stabilizing government, or protecting nunorities? These debates - both
instrumental and ethical - are normative debates, and they impose an
additional set of constraints upon our interpretive practices.
Accordingly, our most important debates about constitutional
interpretation are, at their core, normative debates about the Constitution's
best use.' Should we read the text to define our most basic current
political principles - should we read it as a sacred or canonical text? Or
should we read the text to identify certain historically foundational political
principles - should we try to determine how it was generally understood
as a plan for government m late eighteenth century America? Or should
we read the text as the repository of the wisdom of great men who authored
it - should we read it as an expression of the meaning intended by the
framers? The answers to these various interpretive questions flow in large
part from our answers to the normative questions about what problems the
Constitution ought to address and what readings of the constitutional text
will best address those problems.
In sum, the interpretive question that arises whenever we encounter a
legal text is not whether to treat it as a text or a writing, but a much more
practical question: Why do we care about the text? What problem are we
trying to solve? What is the point of reading the text? The meanings of a
legal text, especially a rich text like the Constitution are limited but
72. Cf., e.g., Campos, Against Constitutional Theory, supra note 4, at 289-98;
Interpretation Symposium, supra note 57, at 551-725 (containing articles on constitutional
interpretation).
73. A text is "rich" if we perceive it as having multiple uses and, consequently, multiple
interpretations. If we perceive the different meanings, but fail to see the specific use to which
each meaning corresponds, the coincidence of multiple meanings can make the text appear
ambiguous. But a text is no more ambiguous because it has multiple meanings - correspond-
ing to its different uses - than a screwdriver is ambiguous because it can be handled m
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variable. Within these limits, our necessarily contextualized decisions
about how to use a legal text will determine its meaning.
V Conclusion
In a recent critique of contemporary hermeneutics, Knapp and
Michaels end with the observation that the advantage of intentionalism "is
not that it is more useful but that it is true."74 There is some irony here
because Knapp and Michaels have elsewhere described their understanding
of interpretation as "pragmatist." 5
The alternative understanding that I have suggested - to view texts as
tools that can be used in a variety of ways - strikes me as a helpful way
of comprehending why we value texts. And when we do view texts in this
way, we can readily see that a text seems rich precisely because it can be
used in a variety of ways. Moreover, we can appreciate why a poem
seems different from a friend's letter or the Constitution: We use the texts
for different purposes.
Viewed in tis way, the meaning of a text flows not from the author's
intent - although a text may, depending on the how the text is used, take
its meaning from that intent - but from one's reasons for reading the text.
Accordingly, debates over the proper interpretation of, say, the Constitu-
tion are, at their core, debates over why we read the Constitution.
My claim, then, is that my view of interpretation is useful. My view
explains our encounters with texts better than the intentionalism of Knapp,
Michaels, and Campos does, and it better enables us to clarify what is at
stake in our disagreements over the interpretation of a text.
My view of interpretation also yields a truly pragmatist understanding
of textual meaning. Practical limits exist on the purposes for which a given
text can be used, and within those limits the meaning of the text is that
which best serves the reader's purposes. The true meaning and the useful
meaning are one and the same.
different ways - corresponding to its different uses. In each case, the tool is versatile.
74. Knapp & Michaels, Intention, Identity, and the Constitution, supra note 3, at 197
75. Knapp, Practice, Purpose, and Interpretive Controversy, supra note 3, at 323; see
Knapp & Michaels, A Reply to RichardRorty, supra note 13, at 472 ("[N]o one can ever
be more or less pragmatist than we are.").
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